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Case Note
Protecting Public Rights in Private Arbitration
Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Since the Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.1 that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act2 can
be subjected to compulsory arbitration, the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in individual employment contracts has been the subject of vigorous
debate. Though mandatory arbitration clauses have been widely criticized in
both the scholarly literature3 and the popular press,' lower courts have
generally upheld these agreements and extended Gilmer's holding to a
variety of statutory claims.5 In Cole v Burns International Security
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2. 29 U S C. § 621 (1994)
3. The inequality of bargaining power between employers and nonunion employees has raiscd concerns
that these agreements are foisted upon workers without any real choice. See. e.g.. Kathenne Van \Vez:-I
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: Vie Yellow Dog Contracts of the 19901.
73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017, 1018 (1996). One author has suggested that arbitration clauses may force
"employees to take their complaints to tribunals that are no better than kangaroo courts." Lew.is Maltby.
Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportuitu. for Alteniative Dispute Resolution To Improve
Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hu si. RTS. 1, 3 (1994). Other scholars fear that an emplo)cr's unique status
as an institutional repeat player may give it an unfair advantage in arbitrator selection. See. e.g. Lisa B
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPLOYEE RTs. & E.%iPLOYEN ," POLY
J. (forthcoming 1997) (providing empirical evidence of the repeat player effect) Finally. scholars warn that
arbitrators may be incompetent and unrepresentative. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE. E.MPLOYE,%T
DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMtNATION DiSPtiT's 2 (1994'
(reporting that 89% of the New York-based New York Stock Exchange arbitrators Acre white males 'A ith
an average age of 60); Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discniiiation Cases An Empirical
Study, 28 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 59, 71-72 (1976) (reporting that 40% of arbitrators do not read
advance sheets to keep abreast of developments under Title VII).
These concerns prompted the Dunlop Commission. the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
and the National Labor Relations Board formally to oppose mandatory arbitration. See COItssIOsio% ONTIlE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT AND REcOtIE.%DATIO\S 32-33
(1994); ADR Services Say The)' ill Continue To Hear Compulsory Arbitration Cases. 22 Pens & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2486, 2487 (Nov. 13. 1995).
4. See. e.g., Roy Furchgott, Workers Who Signed Away a Day in Court. N.Y. TiMEs. July 28. 1996.
at C9; Margaret A. Jacobs, Workers Call Some Private Justice UniUSt. WALL ST. J.. Jan. 26. 1995. at B I
5. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Inc.. 7 F3d I10 (3d Cir. 1993)
(ERISA); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992) (Employee Polygraph
Protection Act); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton. Inc.. 956 F2d 932 (9th Cir 1992) (Title VII),
1157
The Yale Law Journal
Services,6 Judge Edwards offered a reading of Gilmer that would allow courts
to ensure that employer-imposed alternative dispute resolution programs meet
minimum standards of fairness and due process.
This Case Note argues that, although the Cole decision introduces a
promising framework for addressing potential inequities and inadequacies in
mandatory arbitration of individual employment disputes, it does not go far
enough. The court should have followed its own logic and required public
disclosure of arbitration awards to protect the integrity of public law. The matter
is one of great urgency because statutes protecting the rights of individual
employees are being increasingly interpreted and applied in private judicial fora.
I
When Burns Security hired Clinton Cole, it required him to sign an
agreement to submit at the employer's request any employment disputes,
including statutory discrimination claims, to binding arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Fired two years
later, Cole filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and brought charges in federal district court alleging
racial discrimination under Title VII.7 The District Court dismissed Cole's
complaint pursuant to the employer's motion to compel arbitration.
In affirming the validity of the disputed arbitration agreement on appeal,
Judge Edwards (a well-known scholar of labor law)8 provided a new and
thoughtful approach to the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in
individual employment contracts. The court first held that the employment
contract at issue was covered by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
therefore enforceable by a federal court. 9 Mindful of the differences between
labor and individual employment arbitration,"0 the court held that agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims are enforceable only if they do not undermine the
relevant statutory scheme by preventing prospective litigants from effectively
vindicating their claims."
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), is a rare example of judicial reluctance to
enforce an arbitration clause.
6. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) to (17) (1994).
8. See, e.g., HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND
MATERIALS (Michie 4th ed. 1991) (1974); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1986).
9. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470-72.
10. The court carefully distinguished between labor arbitration in the context of a private collective
bargaining agreement, where arbitration is "'part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.' and
serves as the "'substitute for industrial strife,"' id. at 1473 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)), and in the individual employment context, where it serves
merely as a quick and inexpensive private substitute for litigation of statutory rights, see id. at 1473-79.
11. See id. at 1468. Courts have occasionally invalidated arbitration clauses that forfeit statutory rights.
See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating an arbitration clause
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The Cole decision is the first time a court has interpreted Gilmer,
traditionally cited for the proposition that civil rights claims can be subjected
to compulsory arbitration, to limit the enforcement of arbitration clauses.'2 It
did so by requiring, at a minimum, the due process standards provided for by
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration rules. While the agreement
between Burns Security and Clinton Cole was deemed valid, the court held
that agreements requiring the employee to pay the arbitrators' fees are not
enforceable 3 and that arbitrators' rulings on individual employees' statutory
discrimination claims would be subject to meaningful judicial review.'"
II
Cole is a distinguished opinion amid a multitude of post-Gilner decisions
that have mechanically enforced mandatory arbitration clauses without
considering the fairness of the arbitration system at issue.' While respecting
Congress's and the Supreme Court's recent strong endorsements of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR),16 the Cole framework protects against the most
insidious dangers of compulsory arbitration of discrimination claims by
requiring that private resolution programs provide for neutral arbitrators, more
than minimal discovery, a written award, and full legal relief.' Although the
because it forced petroleum franchisees to forgo the right to recover exemplary damages and attorneys' fees
as provided by statute). Courts have thus far not been nearly as recept'e to claims that arbitration
agreements in employment contracts are inconsistent with the relevant statutory scheme See. e g. Nghicm
v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that agreements to arbitrate Title
VII claims are inconsistent with Congress's desire to provide for jury trials under the 1991 amendments);
DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC). 1996 WL 44226 (S D N Y Feb 5. 1996)
(enforcing an arbitration clause that required the employee to waive rights to attorneys' fees, punitive
damages, and injunctive relief in a sexual harassment case).
12. The Cole court's reading of Gilmer was first suggested by Robert Gorman See Robert A Gorman.
The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes. 1995 U ILL L, REv 635. 644
("The Supreme Court in the Gilmer case did not hold that any" sort of arbitration procedure before anv
manner of arbitrator would be satisfactory in the adjudication of public rights."). see also Stone. supru note
3, at 1044 (praising Gorman's analysis of Gilner).
13. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-86.
14. See id. at 1486-87. The court argued that the nearly unlimited deference paid to arbitration awards
in the collective bargaining context is inappropriate for individual employment arbitrations See id. Thus
far, lower courts have not heeded Judge Edwards's call for substantial judicial review See. e g. Chisolm
v. Kidder Asset Mgmt., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218. 226-27 (S.D.N.Y 1997)
15. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce. Fenner & Smith. Inc.. 39 F3d 1482 (00th Cir 1994).
Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.. 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
16. Both the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act specifically encourage
ADR. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66. § 118. 105 Stat. 1071. 1081 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-336. § 513. 104 Stat. 327.
377 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994)). In Gilner. the Court noted that "'generalized attacks on
arbitration ... are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes faonng this
method of resolving disputes."' Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U S 20. 30 (1991) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477. 481 (1989))
17. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
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rules of the major employment arbitration providers would survive the Cole
analysis, those of most private arbitration systems would not.' 8
Regrettably, however, the Cole court ignored an element crucial to a fair
arbitration process: public access to arbitration awards. In determining the
appropriate minimum due process protections, the Cole court relied on dicta
in Gilmer praising the arbitration rules used by the NYSE,19 but ignored
Gilmer's explicit praise of public arbitration decisions. The Supreme Court had
rejected Gilmer's challenge to the arbitration clause in part because the NYSE
rules did not undermine the statutory scheme,2" providing as they did for fair
arbitrator selection procedures, limited discovery, broad equitable relief, and
written and publicly available opinions.
2'
In Cole, the court argued that "Gilmer cannot be read as holding that an
arbitration agreement is enforceable no matter what rights it waives or what
burdens it imposes '' 22 and adopted the procedural protections of the NYSE
rules as minimum preconditions for enforcing private arbitration clauses.23
The logic of the Cole framework thus clearly demands that public access to
arbitration awards be included among the minimum protections required for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. In finding that the agreement between
Bums Security and Clinton Cole satisfied the due process factors addressed in
Gilmer, however, the court overlooked a key difference between the NYSE
rules at issue in Gilmer and the AAA rules in the instant case: NYSE
arbitration decisions are made available to the public while AAA awards are
confidential. 24 In accord with its own reasoning, the Cole court should have
refused to enforce an agreement that does not provide for public decisions.
18. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR
EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) (reporting that most private arbitration
systems do not conform to the procedures recommended by the Dunlop Commission: a neutral arbitrator,
limited discovery, a fair method of cost sharing, the right to independent representation, full legal remedies,
a written opinion, and sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is not inconsistent with the
governing laws). Both the AAA and JAMS/Endispute, two large providers of arbitration services, require
that employment arbitrations meet these standards. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483 n.ll (discussing
JAMS/Endispute); Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, DisP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dee.
1995, at 36, 36 (discussing the AAA).
19. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1481-82 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 1654-55).
20. As the'Court emphasized, "'By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."' Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
21. See id. at 31-32. The Court in Gilmer did not make clear whether these procedural protections
were necessary or merely sufficient to satisfy the statutory scheme. See Gorman, supra note 12, at 646.
22. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
23. See id. at 1482-83. The court also indicated that where an arbitration system presents a due process
issue not raised by the agreement in Gilmer-such as a requirement that the employee pay the arbitrators'
fees-courts must not enforce such agreements without first determining that the arbitration procedure is
a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum and that it allows the employee to vindicate effectively his
statutory cause of action. See id. at 1483-84.
24. The court substituted Gilmer's reference to NYSE Rules 627(a), (e), and (f), which require "that
all arbitration awards be in writing ... [and] made available to the public," Gilner, 500 U.S. at 31-32, with
the bare requirement that there be a "written award," Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
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Confidential, private arbitration of public law issues like employment
discrimination presents significant dangers.Y Public awards and the publicity
surrounding these awards are necessary to deter employers26 and to warn
potential employees. Private decisions do not generate uniform standards to
shape employers' policies2 and, denied access to arbitral awards, plaintiffs
may find it difficult or impossible to establish an employer's pattern or practice
of discrimination.28 Confidential decisions may also hinder the creation of
precedent and the development of the law.29 Legislatures must be able to
monitor the enforcement of public law and to amend legislation when judicial
decisions go awry.30
The Cole court evidently assumed that written arbitration awards,
combined with the continued presence of court decisions and agency
regulations, would adequately respond to these concerns.3' In this, the
decision follows the analysis of Robert Gorman, who defends unpublished
public law awards on the ground that they are unproblematic so long as
published court decisions and agency regulations continue to comprise the
majority of adversary dispositions of such issues.32
Given the surge in employment arbitration in recent years, however, this
assumption is questionable. A 1995 survey conducted by the General
Accounting Office, for example, found that 10% of companies with more than
100 employees used private arbitration systems, while an additional 8% were
25. Though private resolution of legal claims is generally controversial. private arbitration of
employment discrimination claims is particularly problematic. These types of cases display two of the four
characteristics cited by Owen Fiss as inappropriate for private resolution: "signitficant distibutional
inequalities" between the parties and "a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law"
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984) (citing, as the other two characteristics.
the "difficult[y] ... [of] generat[ing] authoritative consent because organizations or social groups atc parties
or because the power to settle is vested in autonomous agents" and the necessity of a court's continual
"supervis[ion of] the parties after judgment").
26. See Stone, supra note 3, at 1047.
27. See id. at 1043.
28. See Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 686 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer'-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, II ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 203, 214-15 (1992). Some argue that
settlement creates the same difficulties. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. See generally Fiss. supra note
25. Cooper argues that settlement and predispute arbitration agreements are very different. however. because
"settlement is based on a prediction of the outcome of litigation: arbitration is based on an avoidance of
the outcome of litigation." Cooper, supra, at 222.
30. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, for example, was in part a response to recent Supreme Court decisions
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in employment discrimination claims. See Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (clarifying that the Act intended to "respond
to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civi rights statutes-). For
discussion of this point, see Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson. Prtvatizng Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer. 44 HASrn,Gs
L.J. 1187, 1237-38 (1993).
31. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. Both the Gilmer and Cole courts were aware of the cnticisms of
confidential arbitration decisions. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32; Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476-78.
32. See Gorman, supra note 12, at 668-69 cf. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 ("[Jjudicial decisions addressing
ADEA claims will continue to be issued because it is unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants will
be subject to arbitration agreements.").
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actively considering doing so. 33 More striking, a recent survey of employers
using external dispute resolution systems found that 85% of the procedures
were implemented since the Gilmer decision, including 20% in the last two
years.34 As confidence in the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses
grows, employers fearful of large jury verdicts and high legal costs will
increasingly include these clauses in employment contracts. It is not alarmist,
therefore, to predict that the trend toward alternative dispute resolution will be
powerful enough to hinder the development of public law in this area.35
Beyond the difficulties posed to the development of employment
discrimination law, confidential procedures make it difficult to assess
arbitration outcomes. The few studies that report plaintiff success rates in AAA
arbitrations do not separate discrimination claims from breach-of-contract or
wrongful discharge claims.36  Given criticism that arbitrators are
unrepresentative and uninformed about developments in discrimination law,37
general studies of plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their claims in all employment
arbitrations may overstate the fairness of outcomes in discrimination
arbitrations. The ability of potential litigants to vindicate their claims
effectively is the touchstone established by the decisions concerning mandatory
arbitration clauses. 3' Denied information on arbitration outcomes, scholars and
legislators cannot evaluate the fairness of ADR, and prospective employees
cannot evaluate the contracts put before them.
-Adriaan Lanni
33. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 18, at 7.
34. See Mei Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DIsP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at
8, 78.
35. Agency regulations and litigation alone cannot fulfill the public law functions of traditional
employment discrimination litigation. The EEOC currently litigates fewer than 1% of the charges it
investigates. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 219-20. Under a policy instituted in 1995, the EEOC now offers
confidential voluntary ADR, see EEOC Votes To Offer Voluntary Mediation as Option in Job
Discrimination Claims, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 80, at D-3 (Apr. 26, 1995), uses a charge-priority
system in an effort to decrease its backlog of cases, see EEOC Adopts Charge-Priority System: Gives
General Counsel More Authority, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at D-3 (Apr. 20, 1995), and having
rescinded its earlier policy of not settling for less than full relief when there was reasonable cause to
believe a violation occurred, actively encourages settlements at all stages in the administrative process, see
id.
36. See Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at
Actual Cases, 47 LAB. LJ. 108, 115 (1996) (reporting that only 2% of the commercial arbitrations studied
involved discrimination claims but failing to provide separate outcome statistics for discrimination claims);
see also Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis
of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995) (analyzing a data set that
included breach-of-contract and wrongful discharge as well as discrimination claims); William M. Howard,
Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should
Happen?, DISP. REs. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 41 (failing to distinguish arbitration outcomes in cases of
discrimination from those in other types of employment claims).
37. See supra note 3.
38. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
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